Researchers have vigorously pursued study of entrepreneurial intentions in the contexts of both commercial and social entrepreneurship (Krueger 1998 (Krueger , 2005 Mair & Marti 2006). Formal models of behavioral intentions offer sound theory and empirical robustness plus well-defined critical antecedents and intentions still remain the best single predictor of human behavior. However, researchers have also long noted that we need a much better understanding of the linkages between intention and action, especially where deeply embedded in a social context (Krueger 2000; Shepherd & Krueger 2002) . We have little systematic, theory-driven knowledge about what precipitates entrepreneurial action, let alone social entrepreneurs. We propose here a model to formally and rigorously study the perceived barriers and triggers to social entrepreneurship and the role of entrepreneurial resilience in that process, using a unique and powerful extreme context: Response to natural disaster. We further propose a large-scale research project to test that model. An in-depth study of entrepreneurial cognitions and resilience among those affected by natural disasters should offer us considerable insight into how entrepreneurial resilience helps social entrepreneurs to respond more effectively to natural disasters. Understanding how entrepreneurs conceptualize barriers (triggers) should be brought into sharp relief by the exigencies of a natural disaster. However, given some of the unique challenges that social entrepreneurs face, this should speak more broadly to the pathways by which social entrepreneurs arrive at -and implement -their intent. As such, this study of social entrepreneurship should speak equally to commercial entrepreneurs.
2000; Shepherd & Krueger 2002) . Does the failure of a social entrepreneur's intention to be realized as action reflect a barrier to action that could not be surmounted?
"Barriers" to Entrepreneurial Action Shapero (1975 Shapero ( , 1982 argued that some sort of "precipitating event" was crucial to the initiation of entrepreneurial action. That precipitating event could be the appearance (or acquisition) of a perceived facilitating factor or the removal (or avoidance) of a perceived inhibiting factor. Shapero noted how the human life course depends considerably upon inertia, that Newton's Second Law tends to guide life decisions. However, what happens when something displaces that inertia and forces individuals to assess future courses of action in a new light? Is the response to act or not act? Many entrepreneurs are born of displacement (Shapero, 1975) .
That is, we can also think of precipitating events as triggers to action or as barriers to actionchanging circumstances can evoke the perception that a positive event has surfaced [or the entrepreneur has surfaced] thus triggering action. However, the same event could be attributed as a barrier being removed. Does the entrepreneur identify the event as a barrier removed or a trigger appearing?
Particularly for social entrepreneurs facing enormous problems, this subtle difference in causal attribution is far from splitting hairs. We have long noted that taking significant action in the face of uncertainty is often influenced by how we frame the data (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky's framing effects that won Kahneman a Nobel). In this case, perhaps a social entrepreneur may be spurred to action if she perceives a resource (like funding) falling into place, but not if she perceives a barrier being removed. The difference my seem trivial but is rooted in deep cognitive processing that humans frequently engage in.
Given the human propensity to simplify our cognitive processing through categorization (opportunity or threat?), mental prototyping (have I seen this before?), and other heuristic shortcuts (Krueger 2003a) , the context of this cognitive processing becomes of paramount importance. A big part of that context is external (e.g., social and family norms, role modeling, mentors) but those external signals get filtered by anchoring beliefs, deep assumptions that are themselves influenced by early experiences (Krueger 2007; Krueger et al. 2007 ). As such, we need to understand not only the barriers/triggers but from whence they derive. Part of that is understanding those deep assumptions, such as those reflected in dominant patterns of causal attributions.
Often the important barriers we need to understand may not be the barriers to launching social venture,s rather the critical barriers to growing social ventures. Investors in social entrepreneurs, e.g., Ashoka and Skoll, prefer to work with social entrepreneurs who seek to scale their social ventures to make a significant, systemic impact. Policy makers would also prefer to focus attention on social ventures of significant scale. If impact and the requisite scalability are critical desiderata, then we need to better understand barriers to (triggers for) high growth. If anything, we understand barriers to growth even less than barriers to launch, despite the centrality of fastgrowing "gazelle" firms to social impact and job creation (e.g., Doern 2006) .
Resilience
Shapero also argued a critical antecedent of entrepreneurial action is some "propensity to act" upon perceived opportunities while Seligman's measure of resilience, learned optimism, has served as a potential proxy .
In the earliest model of entrepreneurial intent, Shapero's model of the "entrepreneurial event" (1975, 1982) suggested that some sort of significant "precipitating event" would trigger the pursuit of a perceived personal opportunity. Figure 1 depicts a more recent incarnation of the model that includes elements of Ajzen's theory of planned behavior.
Research tends to find that barriers explain a significant percentage of the variance in human behavior (Lien, et al. 2002) . However, please note that formal models of intentions typically view the influences on the linkages between intent and behavior to be moderators. That is, the impact is indirect. Nonetheless, the impact of barriers is important, even more so for those seeking to help promote entrepreneurial behaviors.
Intriguingly, there has been perhaps surprisingly little research into the broader question of barriers between intent and action, although Ajzen argues that 'perceived behavioral control' (essentially self-efficacy) moderates the intent-behavior linkage, as well as serving as an independent predictor (Ajzen 1991) . The same research lack is true in research in entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship (Krueger 2003b; Doern 2006) .
One interesting exception from the health literature found that barriers (both facilitating and inhibiting) perceived by those with very strong intentions appear to differ from those perceived by individuals with low intent (Godin, et al. 1994) . Researchers in marketing and in economics (e.g., Julander & Söderlund 2003) have focused on switching barriers: What impedes an individual's ability to change purchasing habits? In technology transfer, Samsom & Gurdon (1993) found that the perceived absence of managerial skills represented a common barrier for inventors to commercialize their inventions.
However, the barriers need not be obvious. Jasinski and Dunn (1998) found that giving entrepreneurship training to motivated inventors at a federal research lab proved remarkably inefficacious. This echoes Brazeal's work (1993) that was spawned by the repeated observation that those best prepared and most desirous of promoting innovation in an organization would rarely take action. What are the perhaps non-obvious barriers that might derail any innovator, especially to act as a social entrepreneur?
Categorizing Barriers/Triggers
Shapero suggested that "precipitating events" come in many guises and are often themselves in the eye of the beholder. However, we can make some interesting distinctions among types of precipitating events, as it would make sense to consider the differential impact of different types of potential triggers. Let us first consider the dimensions noted by Shapero, then Schindehutte, et al.'s more recent typology.
Push vs. Pull: The entrepreneurship field has long considered that the trigger could be either a "push" or "pull" (or perhaps some combination). Something positive might 'pull' the prospective entrepreneur toward starting a venture (e.g., an incredible opportunity). On the other hand, some negative exigency might 'push' an individual toward self-employment (e.g., job loss, forced migration). For example, the GEM studies (e.g., Acs. et al. 2005) have classified the initial motivation to launch as either "necessity" (push) or "opportunity" (pull).
On the other hand, the assessment of "push" versus "pull" is highly subjective. A social entrepreneur might well perceive a seemingly disastrous circumstance as "pulling" them toward entrepreneurial action. Similarly, might someone perceive a great opportunity as a threat by forcing them into unwanted (if socially beneficial) action? In any event, the distinction between perceiving a "push" or a "pull" has a significant cognitive component.
Research suggests that the great majority of entrepreneurs are 'need' ('push') entrepreneurs as opposed to those 'pulled.' For example, much attention is given to high-growth "gazelle" entrepreneurs because of their overwhelming contributions to technology commercialization and job creation. Again, the GEM data strongly suggests the great majority of gazelles were pulled by the significant opportunities that support their explosive growth rates (Acs, et al. 2005 ).
Investors in social entrepreneurs, including both Ashoka and Skoll, are seeking social entrepreneurs who want to scale their social ventures to make a significant, systemic impact. If impact and the requisite scalability being critical desiderata, then we need to better understand "pull" entrepreneurs who are much more likely to grow to scale. Facilitator vs. Inhibitor: As discussed at the outset, Shapero noted that the precipitating event could be the appearance of a something that the individual perceives as facilitating action (a 'facilitator'). However, the precipitating event could also be the removal of a perceived barrier (an 'inhibitor').
Entrepreneurial Barriers/Triggers
Entrepreneurship scholars seem well aware of the need to better understand what precipitates the initiation of entrepreneurial activity, yet most research advanced theoretically. Being absent an appropriate theoretical model such as the formal intentions models, this is understandable. For example, the US Small Business Administration commissioned a very large survey of entrepreneurs regarding perceived barriers to entry, generating a lengthy list of potentially testable 'suspects.' Interestingly, the range of barriers cited was remarkably broad. Other scholars have thus focused on more specific barriers such as financing (e.g., Bates 1995) . However, we have seen little study on the barriers or triggers for social entrepreneurs. What precipitates action that is socially entrepreneurial? Shapero (1975) developed the notion of a precipitating factor as a central component of his model of the entrepreneurial event, but he did not advance a theory-based conceptualization of the construct, beyond a useful categorization of precipitating events. However, Schindehutte, USASBE 2008 Proceedings -Page 1096 Morris and Kuratko (2003: 23) recently presented an equally intriguing typology of triggers. While ostensibly drawn from the domain of corporate entrepreneurship, the typology appears highly applicable to a broader domain. Given the embeddedness of social ventures, the lessons from intra-organizational entrepreneurship should be apt. Schindehutte, et al. (2003: p. 23 We can readily categorize a trigger (or barrier) along these five dimensions. However, it is likely that the entrepreneur's perception of the barrier or trigger is going to be critical. Consider Bates's (1995) lack of capital as a barrier. Is that deemed internal ("I can't find money") or external ("lending dried up")? Would acquiring capital be perceived more as a spur to action than the removal of a negative barrier?
Barriers Also Influence Antecedents of Intent
Cultural factors such as social norms can influence the lenses by which entrepreneurs perceive opportunities and thus could represent significant barriers (Morrison 2000; Doern 2006 ). For example, Pastakia found large cultural barriers to certain kinds of social ventures such as 'green' innovations (1998). Cultural and social values could diffuse perceptions of desirability and thus lowering intentions. However, personal norms, such as one's perceived role demands can also be influential such as whether one perceives themselves as a social activist or as a social entrepreneur (Simms & Robinson 2006) . Moreover, even seemingly strong cultural norms can vary by locale. For example, Nepalese Buddhists are much more entrepreneurial than Canadian Buddhists (Vallière 2006) .
Intriguingly, while self-efficacy judgments about the behavior appear to be a potent, robust predictor of intent, Ajzen (1991) argues that self-efficacy should also predict behavior, independent of its impact via intention. Along those lines, there is increasing evidence that efficacy perceptions with respect to perceived hurdles are also important. That is, one's selfefficacy at surmounting critical barriers is crucial to intent being realized as concrete action (DuCharme & Brawley 1995.) This might represent a fruitful avenue for entrepreneurship scholars to explore in the future, developing a self-efficacy measure specifically based on barriers/triggers 1 .
1
The dominant measure of entrepreneurial self-efficacy (DeNoble, et al., 1999) has proven robust; DeNoble reports (personal communication) the development of a social entrepreneurship self-efficacy scale soon to be deployed.
Resilience and Learned Optimism
Few people would question the importance of human resilience to adversity. However, too often we are hostage to retrospective bias: Successful responders to adversity are deemed resilient. Even if we are not considering how people respond to disasters, we need to identify the critical predictors of resilience.
We often use the term "optimism" to characterize the resilient but the research literature reverses this: Healthy optimism reflects resilience to adversity. Fortunately, we have strong theory and a vast array of empirical data that allows us to thus define a healthy optimism in terms of resilience. Research found that those experiencing learned helplessness share certain cognitive patterns with the clinically depressed. The clinically depressed are typically non-resilient to adversity. From there, researchers then robustly demonstrated in multiple settings the inverse thinking patterns characterize the healthy optimist (Seligman, 1990 ).
The key cognitive pattern was in how individuals tended to make attributions of cause. The exact "cause" per se is less important than the nature of the causal attribution. Typically, humans attribute good outcomes to more internal causes and bad outcomes to more external causes. However, the distinguishing fact is whether the individual attributes the cause as stable (will happen again) or not (will not likely happen again). The optimist chronically makes causal attributions for negative outcomes that are unstable (not permanent), even if they attribute the cause of a negative outcome to themselves ("I screwed up, but I have learned from it!") Even where the optimistic attribution is illusory at best, the resulting resilience is highly functional, spurring both persistence in the face of adversity and effort toward learning how to do better. Such resilience, even if illusory, is associated strongly with initiating and persisting at goaldirected activity. It is also associated significantly with entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial intent . Consider again "lack of capital" as a barrier. The resilient social entrepreneur tends to think of unstable causes ("lending dried up") while the less resilient blame themselves ("I can't find money").
Where Do We Learn Learned Optimism?
Individuals acquire biases toward how they make causal attributions, often at a surprisingly early age. Attributional style pervades many important life decisions and persists through life (Seligman, 1990) . Entrepreneurs' biases toward internal control attributions are welldocumented, moreover, entrepreneurs tend to avoid paralyzing attributions of blame (Gatewood, Shaver & Gartner, 1995) . This belief in control over one's own destiny can be acquired at an early age (Seligman, 1990) . Children of entrepreneurs, particularly successful ones, may learn to make more internal attributions of causality. More important, they may also learn resilience (e.g., Brännback, Krueger, Carsrud & Kickul, 2007; Iannarelli 1992 ).
As such, we can hypothesize that we learn optimism -and that we learn helplessness -from multiple sources. Local social and cultural norms may play a significant role by sending continuous cues about the efficacy of personal agency, sending signals that the recipients need not be fully conscious of. Closer to home, immersion in the beliefs of family and friends can have the same impact. Research into deep beliefs shared by entrepreneurs suggests that much of what we learn from the local culture and from our friends and family results in a form of tacit knowledge, derived from habitual learning. Deep assumptions ultimately find their way into our automatic processing (Krueger 2003a (Krueger , 2007 Krueger, Kickul, Gundry, Verma & Wilson 2007) .
Past research into how resilience to adversity is associated with the barriers perceived by potential entrepreneurs yielded a perhaps surprising result. Subjects exhibiting very high or very low scores on Seligman's learned optimism instrument appeared to report greater numbers of barriers. That is, the highly optimistic and the highly pessimistic both perceived greater numbers (and larger magnitude) of barriers, an interesting conundrum, if replicated, yet highly relevant to understanding social entrepreneurial responses to extreme circumstances (Krueger 2003b ).
Self-Efficacy
A different sort of assumption is much more malleable, Bandura's notion of self-efficacy. Selfefficacy is the judgment of one's ability to execute a target behavior and, as such, has long proven a powerful predictor of goal-directed behavior. Moreover, self-efficacy is more easily molded than attributional patterns by experience and training.
Entrepreneurial self-efficacy was perhaps the first construct that researchers found to be robust in explaining and predicting entrepreneurial phenomena, including entrepreneurial intentions (Krueger & Brazeal 1994; Krueger, et al. 2000) . For example, strong self-efficacy beliefs can override otherwise potent cognitive influences such as Kahneman's framing effects (Krueger 2003a) . Obviously, judgments about one's ability would map closely onto what one see as a barrier or a facilitator (hard to perceive a lack of ability as a positive signal toward action.) As such, research in this arena should assess efficacy judgments, if only as a covariate.
A PROPOSED RESEARCH SETTING: HOW SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS RESPOND TO NATURAL DISASTERS
A recent symposium (Schulte 2007; Stamp 2007 ) addressed how social entrepreneurs responded far more effectively than bureaucratic entities to natural disasters by comparing responses to a similar disaster, the devastating floods that struck New Orleans (in the wake of Hurricane Katrina) and Grand Forks, North Dakota. In both cases, it was the entrepreneurial responses that most often yielded the most positive results.
Overall, Grand Forks responded to their disaster so effectively that few people remember their horrific floods and fires, while the suffering in New Orleans remains vivid globally (Konigsmark, 2007) . While North Dakotans pride themselves on retaining their "pioneer spirit", civic bureaucracy was largely ineffective (Stamp 2007) . While New Orleans is still firmly in the grasp of a more paternalistic culture and bureaucratic forces that failed them, there were truly remarkable efforts by the socially entrepreneurial that have done much to heal the city (Schulte 2007; Lambert 2006) . Consider the Musicians' Village that has taken the lead in restoring the housing stock in the beleaguered Ninth Ward with the entrepreneurial leadership of musicians such as Harry Connick, Jr. (Schulte 2007) .
We believe that the extreme circumstances of a major, sudden natural disaster offer a unique opportunity to understand how social entrepreneurs choose to respond. It should bring into sharp relief how the perceptions of barriers (and triggers) to action differed (a) between those who responded effectively and those who did not and (b) between the two locations.
We have proposed and developed a triangulated approach that permits us to begin addressing several questions that are important to social entrepreneurship in general, not just entrepreneurial responses to natural disaster:
Preliminary Research Questions
• What are the barriers being faced by potential social entrepreneurs?
• How do these barriers vary over time? Across specific settings (nonprofit versus for-profit)?
By gender? Facilitating versus inhibiting?
• How do 'push' (or 'necessity') entrepreneurs differ from 'pull' entrepreneurs?
• Do high-growth entrepreneurs differ from low/no-growth entrepreneurs?
• Do social entrepreneurs differ from commercial entrepreneurs in these patterns?
• How does resilience influence the perception of barriers?
Project Approach
We thus have embarked on a major research effort to examine the differences in both locations in the barriers (triggers) perceived by the bureaucratic and entrepreneurial alike (and by average citizens) and the underlying attributions re those barriers/triggers. We will use the free-response approach first suggested inter alia by Krueger (2003) .
Further, we will assess the degree of resilience (or learned helplessness) by using Seligman's measure of learned optimism (Seligman 1990) , making certain to capture attributions of blame , ability and action as well as resilience. We will also gather related measures associated with social entrepreneurial (and commercial entrepreneurial) activity, such as measures of selfefficacy.)
We propose to triangulate this research by combining the survey approach to measuring these phenomena in these locations with an in-depth content analysis of public statements by key participants. Seligman (e.g., 1990 ) and others demonstrate that content analysis to identify patterns of causal attributions (including attributions of personal and collective efficacy) is highly reliable and valid. Note that not only will we compare the two cities, we can compare the more resilient and less resilient neighborhoods in New Orleans as many neighborhoods have almost fully rebounded while others have not (Konigsmark 2007) Finally, we are gathering appropriate demographic measures as we have long identified how age, education and especially gender affects entrepreneurial intentions and, more recently, cognitive style dramatically affects how intentions evolve (e.g., Kickul & Krueger 2004) 
Future Research Agenda
We also can already see that this kind of analysis opens the doors to significant further research, both basic and applied. An in-depth study of entrepreneurial cognitions and resilience among those affected by natural disasters should offer us considerable insight into how entrepreneurial resilience helps social entrepreneurs to respond more effectively to natural disasters. Understanding how entrepreneurs conceptualize barriers (triggers) should be brought into sharp relief by the exigencies of a natural disaster. However, given some of the unique challenges that social entrepreneurs face, this should speak more broadly to the pathways by which social entrepreneurs arrive at their intent. As such, it should speak equally to our understanding of commercial entrepreneurs, e.g., those facing significant displacement in their industry.
Conceptually, the typologies require further refinement, though Schindehutte et al. (2003) have made heroic progress. In the broader entrepreneurship domain it would be helpful to build a much stronger theoretical base for continued research. However, studying social entrepreneurs and their richer decision context seems likely to surface at least an enhanced view of barriers and triggers in general; studying social entrepreneurs may even identify unique perspectives.
Empirically, once stronger theory is in place we can focus research on how social entrepreneurs deal with precipitating events on a more fine-grained level. For example, how might the consequences differ if a nascent social entrepreneur perceived a trigger as positive (acquiring a resource such as financing) or negative (removing some barrier to capital). Either way, the entrepreneur has acquired financing; does the perception of positive versus negative actually matter? If one sees a barrier as internal versus external, what are the on-the-ground consequences to social entrepreneurs (and their investors)?
Also, consider Godin, et al.'s (1994) findings that perceived barriers might differ qualitatively between high and low intenders; given the range of intent in nascent entrepreneurs (social or commercial), we need to explore this. Is this a relatively linear phenomenon? (Do the barriers identified by extreme optimists and pessimists differ?)
We need to better link this research with attribution theory (Seligman 1990, e.g.) and other social psychological and cognitive psychological constructs. Cognitive mapping seems particularly apt in this context. We certainly need to delve more deeply into the impact of personal resilience to adversity, especially as our measure of resilience, Seligman's learned optimism, reflects a strong grounding in attribution theory.
Similarly, we should tie this work more closely to both self-efficacy and Bandura's parallel notion of collective efficacy ("we can do it"). As the latter construct has proven challenging to measure, given that social ventures arise in complex settings, using the social cognition lens should prove useful (e.g., Shepherd & Krueger 2002) . Also, the findings from this study would let us again consider DuCharme & Bradley's work (1995) suggesting that self-efficacy at surmounting barriers might be a powerful tool to develop. Such a self-efficacy measure should prove remarkably powerful both in researching and assisting the nascent social entrepreneur.
Rigorously researching the barriers to (and triggers for) social entrepreneurs is like the cliché remark about the weather: "Everybody talks about it, but nobody does anything." We are excited about what we are about to learn and we further hope that this will inspire others to push forward research into the cognitive processes of social entrepreneurs! Once again, studying social entrepreneurs offers considerable insight into entrepreneurship writ large. (Shapero, 1982; Krueger & Brazeal, 1994) 
